The WTO Appellate Body Gambles on the Future of the GATS: Analyzing the Internet Gambling Dispute between Antigua and the United States before the World Trade Organization by Tran, Kelly Ann M.
FINAL FINAL 9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM 
101 
THE WTO APPELLATE BODY GAMBLES ON THE FUTURE OF 
THE GATS: 
ANALYZING THE INTERNET GAMBLING DISPUTE 
BETEEN ANTIGUA AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
 
KELLY ANN TRAN 
INTRODUCTION .................................  
I. BACKGROUND ................................  
A. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION—GATS 1995 .......  
B. PREVIOUS WTO DECISIONS ANALYZING ARTICLE XX 
OF THE GATT...............................  
1. United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline..............................  
2. United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products....  
3. Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef........  
C. UNITED STATES—ANTIGUA CASE HISTORY............  
II. ANALYSIS .................................  
A. THE APPELLATE BODY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY APPLY 
THE NECESSITY TEST..........................  
1. The Appellate Body Erroneously 
Shifted the Burden of Proof Away 
from the United States................  
2. The Appellate Body Failed to 
Address the Restrictive Trade 
Impact of the United States’ 
Measures..............................  
B. THE PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY FAILED TO 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS FOOTNOTE 5 OF GATS ARTICLE 
XIV .....................................  
FINAL FINAL 9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM 
C. UNITED STATES INTERNET GAMBLING RESTRICTIONS 
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CHAPEAU OF ARTICLE 
XIV .....................................  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................  
A. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM SHOULD 
FURTHER ADDRESS THE BINDING NATURE OF PREVIOUS 
DECISIONS .................................  
B. WTO MEMBERS SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE GATS MORE PRECISE.............  
C. A REGULATYORY REGIME FOR REMOTE GAMBLING WOULD 
BETTER ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE NATURE OF 
REGULATING INTERNET ACTIVITY .................  
CONCLUSION ...................................  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) 
recent Appellate Body decision in the Antigua—
United States dispute involved a claim by 
Antigua and Barbuda (“Antigua”) that U.S. 
federal and state anti-gambling regulations 
violated U.S. obligations under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).1 The 
U.S. federal laws in question, the Wire Act, 
the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act (“IGBA”),2 allegedly make it 
 
1. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 374, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) 
(requesting that the United States bring its measures, 
found in this Report and in the Panel Report to be 
inconsistent with the GATS, into conformity with its 
obligations under GATS); see General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
 2. Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000) (penalizing 
“betting or wagering” businesses that facilitate “bets 
or wagers on sporting events or contests” over the 
Internet); Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000) 
(defining “unlawful activity” as including any business 
enterprise involving gambling in violation of the laws 
of the United States or the particular state in which 
they are committed); Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1955 (2000) (defining “illegal gambling 
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unlawful for suppliers located outside the 
United States to “remotely” supply gambling 
and betting services to consumers within the 
United States.3 Regulating Internet gambling4
within Antigua is particularly important to 
the United States because a substantial 
portion of offshore Internet gambling sites in 
the nearby Caribbean and Central America are 
located in Antigua.5 By 1999, there were over 
 
business” as a business that violates “the law of a 
State or political subdivision, . . . involves five or 
more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, 
direct, or own all or part of such business, and has 
been or remains in substantially continuous operation 
for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross 
revenue of $2,000 in any single day”). 
 3. See generally Panel Report, United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 3.227, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) 
(defining remote supply of gambling and betting 
services as including situations in which the gambling 
service supplier, whether foreign or domestic, and the 
service consumer are not physically in one place). 
 4. Internet gambling is defined as “any activity that 
takes place via the Internet and that includes placing 
a bet or wager.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO-
03-89, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 1 n.1 
(2002). Wagers and bets, under the typical definition 
put forward by courts, include “a prize, consideration, 
and chance.” Id. 
5. See Joseph M. Kelly, Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 128 (2000); see also John D. 
Andrle, Note, A Winning Hand: A Proposal for an 
International Regulatory Schema with Respect to the 
Growing Online Gambling Dilemma in the United States,
37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1389, 1409 (2004) (explaining 
that the 1994 Antigua and Barbuda Free Trade and 
Processing Zone Area Act established a commission to 
create a tax-free zone for a number of industries, 
including gambling, which caused gambling to become a 
major industry in the area). 
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one hundred licensed Internet gambling 
operators in Antigua.6
In November 2004, the WTO Panel ruled in 
favor of Antigua.7 This decision would have 
required the United States to allow offshore 
casinos to accept U.S. wagers over the 
Internet. However, on April 7, 2005, the WTO 
Appellate Body partially reversed the Panel’s 
decision.8 Both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body found the U.S. ban to be a restriction on 
trade in services under GATS;9 but unlike the 
Panel, the Appellate Body found that, with the 
exception of the potentially discriminating 
Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”),10 the ban 
was “necessary to protect public morals or 
maintain public order.”11 
6. See First Written Submission of Antigua and 
Barbuda, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 7, 
WT/DS285 (Oct. 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/ 
business_politics/pdf/Antigua_FirstSubmission_Executive
Summary.pdf (adding that the revenue generated from 
these activities in 1999 accounted for over ten percent 
of the nation’s gross domestic product that year); see 
also Jeffrey Sparshott, WTO Lets U.S. Limit Internet 
Gambling, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at C8 (noting the 
importance of internet gambling revenue as a supplement 
to Antigua’s tourist business). 
 7. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 7.2, 7.5. 
 8. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 373. 
 9. Id.; Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 7.2(b); see 
also Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Softens Earlier Condemnation 
of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling, but Confirms Broad 
Reach Into Sensitive Domestic Regulation, AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. INSIGHT, Apr. 12, 2005, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/insights050412.htm
l (noting that domestic regulation banning the remote 
supply of gambling services constitutes a “per se 
prohibited market access restriction” because it has 
the effect of keeping out “cross-border supplies of 
gambling services”). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2000) (stating that an 
interstate off-track wager cab be accepted by an off-
track betting system). 
 11. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 
373(D)(vi)(a). 
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This Comment explores whether the Appellate 
Body, in finding that the U.S. restrictions on 
gambling qualified for an exception under 
Article XIV of the GATS, adequately balanced 
international free trade rules with the U.S. 
desire to continue to enforce federal 
restrictions relating to Internet gambling.12 
Part I explains the relevant provisions of 
GATS Article XIV, particularly XIV(a) and the 
chapeau, and the general exceptions to Article 
XIV. Part I also examines the WTO Antigua—
United States Panel Report and provides 
background on previous WTO cases that applied 
and interpreted Article XX of the 1994 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), which 
is similar in language and applicability to 
Article XIV of GATS. Part II argues that the 
Appellate Body erred when it concluded that 
the U.S. gambling restrictions are necessary 
to protect public morals or maintain public 
order. Particularly, Part II argues that the 
Appellate Body failed to adhere to previous 
WTO measures dealing with similar 
jurisprudence and both panels did not 
 
12. Compare Chad Hills, Citizen Link, Focus on Social 
Issues: Gambling in the U.S., The National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission (NGISC) Report (Nov. 26, 2003), 
http://www.family.org/cforum/fosi/gambling/gitus/a00289
77.cfm (providing support for the U.S. interest in 
prohibiting gambling by explaining that "the NGISC 
report clearly states that gambling addiction is 
increasing in the United States as gambling expands"), 
with James D. Thayer, The Trade of Cross-Border 
Gambling and Betting: The WTO Dispute Between Antigua 
and the United States, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Nov. 5, 2004, 
¶¶ 19-20, http://www.law.duke.edu/ 
journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0013.pdf (arguing 
that the U.S. moral exception claim is attenuated 
because of the vast extent of gambling among U.S. 
citizens and the accepted practice of gambling in 
various form throughout all fifty states). 
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adequately explain the significance of 
footnote 5 in GATS Article XIV. Finally, Part 
III recommends that the WTO explicitly 
recognize and more stringently enforce its 
practice of treating prior Panel and Appellate 
Body decisions as binding; the parties to GATS 
clarify the language in Article XIV; and that 
States parties create their own Internet 
gambling regulations to account for the unique 
jurisdictional issues surrounding the 
Internet. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The WTO resulted from the Uruguay Round that 
took place between 1986 and 1994.13 Principle 
among the WTO’s functions are supervising the 
administration of multilateral trade 
agreements, serving as a forum for trade 
negotiations, cooperating with other 
international institutions to facilitate 
cohesive policymaking, and facilitating trade 
dispute resolution.14 
13. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the 
WTO: The Basics, What is the World Trade Organization?, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited May 3, 2006) 
[hereinafter Understanding the WTO] (comparing 
documents negotiated by the WTO to contracts, which 
bind governments to keep their trade policies within 
agreed limits); see also World Trade Organization, The 
WTO in Brief: Part 3, The WTO Agreements, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/
inbr03_e.htm (last visited May 3, 2006) [hereinafter 
the WTO Agreements] (stating that from 1947 to 1994, 
GATT was the forum for negotiating trade agreements and 
since the establishment of the WTO, GATT has become the 
WTO’s umbrella agreement for trade in goods). 
 14. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, art. III, Legal Instruments—Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1145 (1994) [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement]; see also John O. McGinnis & Mark L. 
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. 
Rev. 511, 530-31 (2000) (opining that the WTO’s dispute 
resolution system is its most important function). 
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The GATT is the WTO’s principal authority 
for trade in goods.15 Through the GATT, WTO 
Members operate a non-discriminatory trading 
system that defines their rights and 
obligations.16 The GATS, on the other hand, was 
created to provide a similar system of 
international trade rules for the services 
sector.17 The GATS distinguishes between four 
modes of supplying services: consumption 
abroad, commercial presence, presence of 
natural persons, and cross-border supply, 
which is the mode of service relevant in the 
United States—Antigua dispute.18
A. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION—GATS 1995 
The Uruguay Round resulted in the creation 
of the GATS, mainly because services are the 
largest and most active component of both 
developed and developing countries.19 GATS 
requires each Member to have a schedule of 
specific commitments that identifies the 
 
15. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 14, Annex 1A 
[hereinafter GATT].  
 16. See The WTO Agreements, supra note 13 (noting that 
each Member of the WTO receives guarantees that its 
exports are fairly and consistently treated within 
other countries’ markets). 
 17. GATS, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 1. 
 18. See World Trade Organization, Services: GATS, The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): 
Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm 
(last visited May 3, 2006) [hereinafter GATS: 
Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines] (defining cross-
border supply "to cover services flows from the 
territory of one Member into the territory of another 
Member"). 
 19. See id. (stating that services "account for over 
60 percent of global production and employment"). 
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services for which the Member guarantees 
market access, therefore binding the Member to 
that specified level.20 The Member undertakes 
not to impose any new measures that would 
restrict entry into the market or the 
operation of a service.21 
This gambling dispute is the first occasion 
in which a WTO Member raised an argument under 
Article XIV, which provides for general 
exceptions to the GATS.22 Therefore, the Panel 
is unable to use prior GATS jurisprudence as a 
guiding framework.23 Even if there were 
previous decisions interpreting Article XIV, 
stare decisis does not apply to the WTO.24 
However, previous decisions remain persuasive 
and may have a binding nature.25 
20. See generally GATS, supra note 1. 
 21. See World Trade Organization, Services: Schedules, 
Guide to Reading the GATS Schedule of Specific 
Commitments and the List of Article II (MFN) 
Exemptions, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm 
(last visited May 3, 2006) (explaining that specific 
commitments "are a guarantee to economic operators in 
other countries that the condition of entry and 
operation in the market will not be changed to their 
disadvantage"). 
 22. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.447; see also 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 291 n.351 
(noting that the United States—Antigua dispute is also 
the first instance defining public morals and public 
order). GATS Article XIV lists several general 
exceptions, preceded by the caveat that all members 
must agree not to apply an exception in a 
discriminatory manner, in order to avoid a “disguised 
restriction on trade in services.” GATS, supra note 1, 
art. XIV.  
 23. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.447. 
 24. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at 
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political 
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 254 (2004).  
 25. See id. (arguing that the Appellate Body does 
seems to observe de facto stare decisis, but the WTO 
Agreement expressly places exclusive interpretory 
powers with the Ministerial Conference and General 
Council). 
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Similar to the GATT, the objectives of the 
GATS are grounded in trade liberalization and 
the desire to foster a mutually advantageous 
trading framework among countries.26 Despite 
the GATS goal of promoting free trade, Article 
XIV contains general exceptions to the GATS.27 
If a measure is found inconsistent with one 
of a party’s substantive obligations under the 
GATS, the measure is subjected to a two-tiered 
analysis to determine if it is justifiable 
under Article XIV.28 First, the WTO panel must 
determine whether the measure falls within one 
of the provisions of Article XIV.29 The 
analysis requires “a sufficient nexus between 
the measure and the interest protected.”30 The 
required nexus is generally specified within 
the language of the provision31 and, in this 
 
26. GATS, supra note 1, pmbl. (making specific 
reference to the need to account for the particular 
needs of developing countries, including their need to 
regulate the internal supply of services). 
 27. Id. art. XIV; see also id. art. XVbis (providing 
additional exceptions specifically related to 
security). 
 28. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 118, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) 
[hereinafter Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp]
(recounting the two-tier process announced by the 
appellate body in the United States—Gasoline case). 
 29. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 292 
(determining that Members can pursue objectives 
identified in the provisions of Article XIV, even if 
Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in 
other provisions of the agreements, provided that the 
objectives satisfy all necessary conditions of Article 
XIV). 
 30. Id. 
31. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 16-17, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate 
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case, because the United States defended its 
measure under Article XIV(a), the WTO dispute 
resolution bodies examined whether the measure 
is “necessary” to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order.32 Additionally, footnote 
5 of Article XIV(a) requires that “[t]he 
public order exception may be invoked only 
where a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat is posed to one of the fundamental 
interests of society.”33 The term “order,” when 
read together with footnote 5, refers to the 
preservation of society’s fundamental 
interests, which includes standards of law, 
security and morality.34 Under the second tier 
of the analysis, the measure must meet the 
requirements of the introductory provisions—
chapeau—of Article XIV, where the WTO panel 
then must determine whether the measures are 
applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary 
or unjust discrimination.35 
Body, United States—Gasoline] (noting that the general 
rule in treaty interpretation is that terms should be 
interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning, 
giving consideration to the context of the terms, in 
light of the purposes and objects of the treaty). 
 32. See, e.g., Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6.465-
6.487 (noting that the term ‘public morals’ “denotes 
standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or 
on behalf of a community or nation” and that the 
legislative history of the U.S. laws in question 
indicate the protection of fundamental interests, such 
as minimizing fraud and underage gambling). 
33. GATS, supra note 1, art. XIV n.5. In International 
Legal Materials, this appears as footnote 12. 
 34. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6.467-6.469 
(explaining the intention of the drafters of the GATS, 
in regards to footnote 5). Although “public order” and 
“public morals” are two distinct concepts, there is 
overlap because they protect similar values. 
 35. Id. art. XIV; see also Vicente Paolo B. Yu, III, 
Technical Comments on the WTO’s “GATS—Fact and Fiction” 
Paper, http://www.gatswatch.org/docs/ foei.html (last 
visited May 3, 2006) (arguing that the language 
expressed in the introductory clause of Article XIV 
creates an additional barrier to the adoption and 
enforcement of measures that violate a country’s GATS 
commitments). If the disputed measures do not meet the 
requirements of the chapeau, it is considered 
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B. PREVIOUS WTO DECISIONS ANALYZING  
ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 
Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of 
the GATS are similar in context and purpose.36 
Therefore, the WTO dispute resolution bodies 
consider prior jurisprudence addressing GATT 
Article XX as relevant and useful in 
interpreting GATS Article XIV.37 The relevant 
interpretation of “necessary” under previous 
Article XX decisions entails an evaluation of 
whether the measure is likely to achieve the 
stated policy objective of protecting against 
identified risks and whether there is a strong 
connection between the interests the measure 
protects and the necessity of the measure.38 
inconsistent with the GATS. Id. A likely result is that 
the non-complying country must alter its measure or 
suffer retributions such as paying compensation or 
suffering retaliatory sanctions. Id. 
36. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 291 
(noting that both permit country deviations in the 
pursuit of specified policy objectives); see also World 
Trade Org., Environment Backgrounder: Relevant GATT/WTO 
Provisions, GATT 1994—Article XX on General Exceptions, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
envir_e/envir_backgrnd_e/c7s3_e.htm (last visited May 
3, 2005) (noting that in applying Article XX, the 
purpose of the WTO-inconsistent measure must aim either 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and 
additionally, the disputed measure must meet the 
requirements of the necessity test). 
 37. See Appellate Body Report, supra note, ¶ 291 
(affirming the Panel’s use of GATT jurisprudence). 
 38. See generally Christoph T. Fedderson, Focusing on 
Substantive Law in International Economic Relations: 
The Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX(A) and 
“Conventional” Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 75, 95 (1998) (reviewing divergent opinions on 
whether GATT Article XX deserves a narrow 
interpretation and noting that "the rule of strict 
construction is flexible enough to achieve either a 
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The “necessity test” involves balancing 
three factors: “(1) the degree to which the 
common interests or values that the measure 
protects are vital and important, (2) whether 
alternative measures are ‘reasonably 
available’ to accomplish the stated objective, 
and (3) whether alternative measures are 
inconsistent with the Member’s WTO 
obligations.”39 To adequately apply Article XIV 
to the United State—Antigua dispute, the 
Appellate Body had previous WTO 
interpretations of Article XX of the GATT for 
guidance, particularly its decisions in United 
States—Gasoline, United States—Shrimp, and 
Korea—Beef.
1. United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and  
Conventional Gasoline 
The United States Congress amended the Clean 
Air Act in 1990, which, through subsequent 
regulations, permitted domestic refiners to 
establish an individual baseline representing 
the quality of their 1990 gasoline before 
forcing them to use the EPA’s statutory 
baseline.40 The disparity in the Clean Air Act 
 
narrow or broad interpretation of the Exceptions 
Clause”). 
 39. See Tatjana Eres, Note, The Limits of GATT Article 
XX: A Back Door for Human Rights?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
597, 625 (2004) (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea—
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, ¶¶ 162-66, WT/DS161 (Dec. 11, 2000) (arguing that 
the validity of the original measure is particularly 
relevant under the second aspect, which examines 
whether any alternative measures are "reasonably 
available"). 
 40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (stating that the amendments 
purported to ensure that the level of air pollution 
caused by gasoline combustion did not exceed 1990 
levels, thus reducing the pollutants in major 
metropolitan areas); see also Appellate Body, United 
States—Gasoline, supra note 31, at 21 (noting the 
Panel’s finding that imported and domestic gasoline 
were “like products,” but under the baseline 
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was that foreign refiners were not afforded 
the same permission in establishing their 
baselines, which induced complaints from 
foreign countries, including Venezuela and 
Brazil.41 
The Panel found that the United States 
failed to meet the “necessity test” under 
Article XX because there was no direct 
connection between less favorable treatment of 
imported gasoline and the U.S. objective of 
improving its air quality.42 Conversely, the 
Appellate Body found the Panel erred by ruling 
that the baseline establishment rules did not 
constitute a measure “relating to” the 
conservation of clean air within the meaning 
of Article XX, and consequently failed in its 
analysis to further examine the chapeau, or 
introductory clause, of Article XX.43 
The Appellate Body determined that the Clean 
Air Act did not meet the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XX.44 The U.S. failure to 
 
establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule, imported 
gasoline did not benefit from as favorable sales 
conditions as domestic gasoline). 
 41. See Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra 
note 31, at 6. 
 42. Panel Report, United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 
29, 1996). 
 43. Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra note 
31, at 28; see also Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading 
of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction 
on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
739, 758 (2001) (arguing that the Appellate Body 
formulated a more sophisticated analysis of Article XX 
and "shifted its attention, for the first time in any 
such proceeding, to the conditions placed on the use of 
a measure in the chapeau to Article XX"). 
 44. Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra note 
31, at 27; see also Gaines, supra note 43, at 759 
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explore other means, including cooperative 
arrangements, and its disregard of the costs 
for foreign refiners from the imposition of 
baselines, constituted “unjustifiable 
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction 
on international trade.”45 
2. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain  
Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand 
brought the United States—Shrimp case to the 
WTO, disputing Section 609 of a 1990 
appropriations bill amending the U.S. 
Endangered Species Act.46 Section 609 states 
that in order to export shrimp into the United 
States, countries must obtain certification 
showing that they equipped their vessels with 
turtle-excluder devices.47 
(finding that the Appellate Body did not need to 
establish an elaborate interpretation of “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” because the U.S. 
regulations facially discriminated between domestic and 
foreign refiners). 
 45. Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra note 
31, at 27. 
 46. See Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, at 1; 
see also International Trade Data System, Import 
Restrictions Under Environmental Laws, 
http://www.itds.treas.gov/EnvImp.htm (last visited May 
3, 2006) (noting that the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 protects animal and plant species currently in 
danger of extinction and those that may become 
endangered in the future); Dukgeun Ahn, Note, 
Environmental Disputes in the GATT/WTO: Before and 
After US—Shrimp Case, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 819, 836 
(1999) (stating that the most significant risk to the 
species of sea turtles was the incidental capture and 
drowning of the sea turtles by shrimp trawlers). 
 47. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act § 
609, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 101 Stat. 988, 1037-38 
(1990); see also Ahn, supra note 46, at 838 (recounting 
that in 1996, the U.S. embargo on shrimp was being 
enforced on "shrimp or products from shrimp harvested 
in the wild by citizens or vessels of nations which 
have not been certified", even though some of the boats 
may have been equipped with turtle excluder devices). 
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The Appellate Body examined the chapeau and 
considered whether the application of the 
measure would constitute a means of “arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail” 
or a “disguised restriction on international 
trade.”48 The Appellate Body found that the 
Panel did not examine Article XX’s ordinary 
meaning,49 disregarding that the application of 
the Article’s introductory clauses is 
essential to the analysis.50 
The Appellate Body found that Section 609 
constituted both unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination because the United States 
required all importing countries to adopt a 
comprehensive regulatory program that was 
essentially the same as the U.S. program, 
without inquiring if the program was 
appropriate for the conditions in the 
exporting countries.51 Additionally, the U.S. 
 
48. United States—Shrimp, supra note 28, ¶¶ 98, 113 
(presenting the issues of the case and an introduction 
to Article XX of the GATT). 
49. Id. ¶ 115 (finding that the Panel did not look 
into the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article 
XX). 
 50. See Yasmin Moorman, Note, Integration of ILO Core 
Rights Labor Standards into the WTO, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 555, 571 (2001). The standards of the 
chapeau are both substantive and procedural because a 
facially neutral measure, applicable in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, is considered discriminatory. 
Id.; see also Timothy M. Reif & Julie Eckert, Courage 
You Can’t Understand: How to Achieve the Right Balance 
Between Shaping and Policing Commerce in Disputes 
Before the World Trade Organization, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 657, 694 (2004).  
 51. United States—Shrimp, supra note 28, ¶¶ 161, 176-
77. But cf. Chris Wold & Glenn Fullilove, International 
Environmental Law Project, Analysis of the WTO 
Appellate Body’s Decision in Shrimp/Turtle (Feb. 24, 
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failure to reach an international agreement 
with the complaining WTO Members was 
“unjustifiable discrimination” because the 
United States completed an agreement with 
Latin American countries.52 
3. Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,  
Chilled and Frozen Beef 
Australia and the United States brought the 
Korea—Beef case to the WTO, disputing Korean 
measures that affected the importation of beef 
products.53 Specifically, they contested the 
separate retail distribution channels (“dual 
retail system”) that existed for imported and 
domestic beef products, which allegedly 
benefited domestically-supplied beef.54 Korea 
raised an argument under Article XX, claiming 
that even if the Appellate Body disagreed with 
Korea’s claim that the dual retail system was 
consistent with the GATT, the system was 
justifiable.55 
2000), http://www.lclark. 
edu/org/ielp/turtlebriefing.html (arguing that even 
though applying the same rules to both foreign and U.S. 
shrimpers may be inequitable, it is not discriminatory 
because "discrimination" is treating all products 
differently). 
 52. Cf. id. (arguing that conditions may differ in 
some countries, so the Appellate Body should not infer 
that the successful negotiation of an international 
treaty with Latin America should result in a successful 
treaty with the Asian countries). 
 53. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef,
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate 
Body, Korea—Beef]. 
 54. Id. ¶¶ 35-41, 50-60. The dual retail system for 
beef included “the obligation for department stores and 
supermarkets authorized to sell imported beef to hold a 
separate display, and the obligation for foreign beef 
shops to bear a sign with the words ‘Specialized 
Imported Beef Store.’” Id. ¶ 5. 
 55. Id. ¶ 23 (arguing that Korea’s regulatory goal of 
eliminating deceptive retail practices justified the 
dual retail system).  Korea’s goal was not merely the 
“reduction or limitation” of deceptive retail 
practices, but their “elimination.” Id. 
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Applying Article XX, the Appellate Body 
noted that the reach of the word “necessary” 
is not limited to that which is “indispensable 
or an absolute physical necessity,” although 
measures which fall under those categories 
would certainly fulfill the requirements of 
Article XX.56 There are varying degrees of 
necessity, such as the less stringent standard 
of “making a contribution to.”57 In Korea—Beef,
the Appellate Body set a stricter standard of 
necessity, one that is located closer to the 
side of “indispensable,” not the less 
stringent “making a contribution to.”58
The Appellate Body articulated a balancing 
test for making a determination as to whether 
a measure is “necessary” under Article XX. 
That test includes “the contribution made by 
compliance with the measure to the enforcement 
of the law or regulation at issue, the 
importance of the common interests or values 
protected by that law or regulation, and the 
accompanying impact of the law or regulation 
on imports or exports.”59 The Panel found that 
Korea did not apply a dual retail system for 
other products in which fraudulent sales 
 
56. Id. ¶ 160 (noting that a standard law dictionary 
definition of “necessary” highlights its distinctive 
contextual meanings). 
 57. Id. See generally Alan O. Sykes, The Least 
Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 405 (2003) 
(arguing that necessity or least restrictive means 
tests embody the WTO’s commitments to lower trade 
barriers). 
 58. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 
161. 
 59. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 164. 
The Appellate Body noted that a measure is more likely 
to be considered “necessary” when its impact on 
imported products is minimal. Id. ¶ 163. 
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previously occurred.60 This indicated that the 
dual retail system was not “necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement” under Article XX.61 
The Panel stated that Korea’s burden was 
showing that no alternative measures 
consistent with the WTO agreement were 
reasonably available or that an alternative 
measure was technically or financially 
burdensome.62 The Appellate Body therefore made 
clear that a Member must first explore and 
exhaust all GATT/WTO compatible alternatives 
before resorting to WTO-inconsistent 
measures.63 
C. UNITED STATES—ANTIGUA CASE HISTORY 
This dispute began in March 2003, when 
Antigua requested formal consultations with 
the United States and the WTO concerning the 
U.S. ban on cross-border gambling and betting 
 
60. See Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports 
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 660-64, 
WT/DS161/R (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Panel Report, 
Korea—Beef; see also Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra 
note 52, ¶ 153 (finding that Korea used "traditional 
enforcement measures" such as "record-keeping, 
investigations, policing, and fines," rather than a 
dual retail system, for related products where 
fraudulent misrepresentation occurred). 
 61. Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 59, ¶ 665; 
see also Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 52, ¶ 
153 (noting that Korea had the burden of demonstrating 
to the satisfaction of the Panel that alternative 
measures consistent with the WTO Agreement were not 
reasonably available). 
 62. Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 59, ¶ 665; 
cf. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 153 
(noting Korea’s contention that ex post facto 
investigations do not guarantee the level of 
enforcement that Korea has chosen and with respect to 
policing, that option is not reasonably available 
because Korea lacks the resources to police thousands 
of shops on a round-the-clock basis). 
 63. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶¶ 180-
82. 
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services.64 Consultations between the parties 
failed to resolve the dispute, and upon 
request by Antigua, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (“DSB”) established a panel to resolve 
the matter.65 
Antigua claimed that U.S. laws prohibiting 
the cross-border supply of gambling services 
are inconsistent with provisions of the GATS.66 
Antigua argued that the United States violated 
market access provisions, set out in its 
schedule of commitments, by barring the supply 
of gambling services on a cross-border basis.67 
Specifically, the U.S. GATS Schedule makes “a 
full commitment for the cross-border supply of 
services classified under subsector 10.D 
‘Other recreational services (except 
sporting).’”68 
The United States justified its restrictions 
on Internet gambling as an exception from its 
GATS commitments based on Article XIV(a), 
which states that the GATS agreement shall not 
 
64. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, 
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1 
(Mar. 27, 2003). 
 65. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 1.2. 
 66. Id.; see also Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Condemnation of 
U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade Against 
Moral Values, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHT, Nov. 2004, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/11/insight041117.html 
(stating that Antigua’s argument relied on whether in 
the GATS, the United States made international 
commitments to gambling services, particularly arguing 
that the United States agreed to not enact restrictions 
on “recreational services”). 
 67. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 3.30. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 3.30-3.31 (noting that the United States 
did not adequately explain why gambling and betting 
services should be excluded in light of the wording of 
its schedule of commitments). 
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prevent governments from adopting or enforcing 
measures deemed “necessary” to protect public 
morals or maintain public order.69 As the party 
seeking to invoke Article XIV, the United 
States had the burden of proof in support of 
its assertion that the challenged measures 
satisfy the requirements of Article XIV.70 In 
defense of perceived GATS violations, the 
United States argued that its measures are 
exempt under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c); the 
application of these exceptions are consistent 
with the chapeau of Article XIV.71
The United States argued that the remote 
supply of gambling and betting services raised 
significant concerns relating to the 
maintenance of public order and the protection 
of public morals under Article XIV(a).72 
Specifically, the United States identified two 
primary issues of concern. Internet gambling 
provides increased opportunities for minors to 
gamble; gambling within the United States is 
not permissible for minors.73 Age verification 
 
69. Id. ¶¶ 6.443-6.446; see also Jeremy Hutto, What Is 
Everybody Else Doing About It? A Foreign Jurisdictional 
Analysis of Internet Gaming Regulation, 9 GAMING L. REV.
26, 33 (2005) (stating that the main U.S. argument for 
regulating Internet gambling is "to protect children 
and prevent financial crimes"). Following the Panel 
Report, the Bush Administration announced that it will 
adamantly contest the Panel’s decision. Id. 
70. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.450 
(recounting the burden of proof test articulated by the 
Appellate Body in Unites States—Wool Shirts and 
Blouses). 
 71. Id. ¶ 6.443. 
 72. Id. ¶ 6.444; cf. John Warren Kindt & Stephen W. 
Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of 
National and International Economies: Time for a 
Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World Wide Web,
80 DENV. U. L. REV. 111, 111 (2002) (arguing that 
"social, financial, and political costs," including 
"the creation of new gambling addicts, bankruptcies, 
and crime," was directly caused by "the widespread 
proliferation and accessibility of gambling sites on 
the Internet"). 
 73. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.444. 
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is a specific concern because operators of 
gambling websites cannot look at their 
customers to assess their age or request photo 
identification.74 Additionally, internet 
gambling can also be used to “launder the 
proceeds of organized crime.”75 The remote 
supply of gambling is more dangerous than the 
non-remote supply of such services because of 
the amount of money and manipulability 
inherent in Internet gambling.76 Further, the 
United States argued that it did not apply its 
laws in a discriminatory manner; domestic 
suppliers of remote gambling services also 
fall within the purview of the laws in 
question and are equally subject to 
enforcement actions.77 
74. Cf. IGamingNews.com, New Research Shows that 
Minors Have Easy Access to Online Gambling Services 
(July 27, 2004), http://www.igamingnews. 
com/index.cfm?page=artlisting&tid=5250 (discussing a 
study that tested thirty-seven online gambling sites 
"to see if a minor could set up an account"). The study 
found that "the minor was able to open up an account 
and access gambling systems on thirty of the sites." 
Id. 
75. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.444. The United 
States argued that internet gambling is, in general, 
more susceptible to criminal endeavors and activities. 
Id. ¶ 6.457. In its submission to the Appellate Body, 
Antigua argued that the Panel impermissibly advocated 
several other factors associated with internet gambling 
that would support the U.S. action under Article XIV, 
including fraud and public health. Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 1, ¶ 278. 
 76. But see I. Nelson Rose, The Legalization and 
Control of Casino Gambling, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 267-
99 (1980) (arguing that one of the factors contributing 
to the influence of organized crime is the need for 
investment capital; the migration to online gambling 
may diminish the importance of organized crime because 
there is less capital required to build online casinos, 
compared to conventional casinos). 
 77. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.586 (reviewing 
FINAL FINAL 9/28/2006 12:16:26 PM 
Since the United States is a major consumer 
of (domestic) state sanctioned gambling and 
betting services, Antigua questioned why a 
prohibition on the remote supply of gambling 
is necessary to protect public morals.78 In 
regards to the requirements of the chapeau, 
Antigua argued that the U.S. measures’ 
discriminatory motive is shown by a lack of 
enforcement against domestic suppliers of 
remote gambling services.79 
In its report, the Panel examined whether 
the purpose of the disputed measures was to 
protect public morals and to maintain public 
order. The Panel defined “public morals” as 
“standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by a community or nation;”  “public 
order” concerns “the preservation of the 
fundamental interests of a society.”80 The 
Panel found that in addition to protecting 
against underage gambling and organized crime, 
congressional reports related to the Wire Act, 
Travel Act, and IGBA demonstrated that the 
laws were also established to minimize fraud, 
money laundering, and health concerns stemming 
from pathological gambling.81 The Panel further 
determined that footnote 5 of Article XIV was 
met because the United States presented 
evidence that organized crime posed specific 
threats, which was enough to satisfy the 
 
statistics provided by the U.S. Department of Justice 
that point to ninety prosecutions of domestic remote 
suppliers between 1992 and 2002). 
 78. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.444. 
 79. Id. ¶ 6.585 (contrasting the lack of enforcement 
against U.S. suppliers with a case in which the United 
States prosecuted and convicted an Antiguan internet 
sportsbook service). 
 80. Id. ¶¶ 6.465-6.467; see Appellate Body Report, 
supra note 1, ¶ 296 (referring to "Congressional 
reports and testimony" that the adopted measures 
addressed concerns "pertaining to money laundering, 
organized crime, fraud, underage gambling and 
pathological gambling"). 
 81. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.486. 
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footnote’s high standard.82 Accordingly, these 
measures fell within the purview of GATS 
Article XIV(a) in terms of the measures’ 
designed purpose.83 However, since the United 
States failed to consult with Antigua before 
imposing the restrictive measures, the Panel 
determined that the important reasons for 
imposing restrictions that could render the 
measures necessary do not outweigh the U.S. 
failure to consult with Antigua on other 
available alternatives.84 
Despite the Panel’s necessity ruling, it 
further proceeded to determine if the measures 
were applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
way—whether the application violated the 
chapeau.85 In its findings, the Panel concluded 
that the United States did not demonstrate 
that it applied the disputed laws, the IHA in 
particular, in a non-discriminatory manner 
between domestic and foreign-service 
suppliers.86 
On appeal, the Appellate Body affirmed the 
Panel’s Article XIV(a) conclusions that the 
U.S. measures were “designed” to protect 
public order; the requirements of footnote 5 
were also met.87 The contours of the 
 
82. Id. ¶ 3.279.  
 83. Id. ¶ 6.487. 
 84. Id. ¶¶ 6.532-6.534 (noting the U.S. obligation to 
pursue WTO-consistent alternatives in good faith, 
regardless of the possible U.S. belief that such 
negotiations would not be fruitful). 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 6.569-6.608. 
 86. Id. ¶ 6.607 (concluding that the United States had 
failed to meet its evidentiary burden). The Panel 
specifically mentioned the “ambiguity” surrounding the 
Internet Horseracing Act. Id. 
 87. Appellate Body, supra note 1, ¶ 298 (noting that 
the Panel’s lack of numerous explicit references to 
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“necessity” test were then reviewed. The 
Appellate Body noted that while the 
evidentiary burden lies on the United States, 
it does not have the impractical burden of 
identifying the universe of less restrictive 
reasonable alternatives to the measures in 
question.88 As an unwarranted procedural 
hurdle, the Appellate Body refuted the Panel’s 
requirement that a measure’s “necessity” 
requires consultation; rather, necessity is 
based on an objective assessment of reasonable 
alternatives.89 All of the other factors 
expressed by the Panel weighed in favor of 
necessity—e.g., “very important societal 
interests” warranting strict controls, and the 
three statutes in question “contribute to the 
realization of the ends that they pursue”—so 
the Appellate Body determined that the U.S. 
measures did, in fact, satisfy the necessity 
test.90 
Having reversed the Panel’s conclusions on 
necessity, the Appellate Body went on to 
consider whether the U.S. measures were 
discriminatory under the chapeau. The 
Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel’s 
finding that the United States enforced its 
gambling laws more strictly against foreigners 
than against domestic suppliers,91 but the 
Appellate Body deemed that the Panel was 
 
footnote 5 did not mean that its requirements were not 
considered by the Panel). 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 309-10 (indicating that a responding party 
is merely obligated to make a prime facie showing of 
necessity). 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 316-17. 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 322-27 (adding that the restrictive trade 
impact of the U.S. measures was tempered by "the 
specific concerns associated with remote gambling," 
such as the specific problems of anonymity on the 
internet). 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 355-56 (arguing that the Panel erred by 
basing its conclusions on enforcement actions in five 
cases because contextual considerations mandate an 
assessment of the overall patterns of enforcement). 
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partially correct when it determined that the 
IHA is potentially discriminatory.92 Because of 
the textual similarities between Article XX of 
the GATT and Article XIV of the GATS, the 
Appellate Body acknowledged that its previous 
interpretations of Article XX are applicable 
in analyzing Article XIV.93 
II. ANALYSIS 
The function of the Panel is to make “an 
objective assessment of the matter before 
it.”94 The Appellate Body determined that with 
respect to Article XIV of the GATS, the Panel 
did not fail to make an objective assessment 
of the facts.95 The Appellate Body therefore 
erroneously reversed key aspects of the 
 
92. Id. ¶ 361 (accepting Antigua’s argument that the 
Interstate Horseracing Act, "on its face, authorizes 
domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service 
suppliers, to offer remote betting services in relation 
to certain horse races"). 
 93. Id. ¶ 291 (finding that the language in both 
Article XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT are 
similar, notably the use of the word “necessary,” as 
well as the requirements set out in the respective 
chapeaus); see also Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare 
Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a 
Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 917-18 (1999) 
(distinguishing between “formal bindingness” and “not 
formally binding, but having force” as a difference 
between “authoritative” and “persuasive” forces 
characterized by degree). 
 94. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1994). 
 95. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 373 
(finding that the Panel did not fail to meet its 
requirements under Article 11 of the DSU, but reversed 
the Panel’s findings regarding paragraph (a) and the 
chapeau). 
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Panel’s findings. The Appellate Body’s finding 
that the United States’ restrictions on 
Internet gambling qualified for an exception 
under Article XIV of the GATS, which reversed 
the Panel’s decision, also did not adhere to 
previous WTO decisions interpreting Article XX 
of the GATT.96 
Following the two-tiered analysis, the 
Appellate Body erred both when it determined 
that the United States’ Internet gambling 
restrictions fell within one of the paragraphs 
of Article XIV and when it determined that the 
measure satisfied the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XIV.97 The Appellate Body 
also failed to comply with its obligation to 
adequately uphold the free trade objectives of 
the GATS.98 
A. THE APPELLATE BODY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY  
APPLY THE NECESSITY TEST 
96. See Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto 
Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a 
Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (1999) (arguing 
that precedent guides the WTO because of "the custom or 
habit of the tribunal, the tribunal’s sense of justice 
(particularly to treat likecases alike), the tribunal’s 
need for efficiency," and the tribunal’s desire to make 
decisions that are consistent with the expectations of 
all parties). 
 97. See World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical 
Index: General Agreement on Trade in Services, General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_inde
x_e/gats_02_e.htm#fnt39 (last visited May 3, 2006) 
(noting that because Article XIV constitutes an 
exception provision, it should be narrowly interpreted 
and its scope cannot be expanded to cover other 
regulatory objectives than those listed). 
 98. See Anup Shah, Free Trade and Globalization, The 
WTO And Free Trade, 
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/WTO.
asp?p=1 (last updated Dec. 27, 2001) (criticizing the 
WTO for its inability to promote cooperation between 
rich and developing countries, with regards to 
international trade). 
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The Appellate Body erred when it found that 
these measures are “necessary.”99 The purpose 
of this requirement under Article XIV(a), that 
a measure be necessary or that there is no 
reasonably available WTO-consistent 
alternative, reflects the shared understanding 
that Members should not deviate from their 
substantive GATS obligations unless there is 
an absolute need.100 Because previous WTO 
decisions in United States—Gasoline, United 
States—Shrimp, and Korea—Beef demonstrated a 
recent trend towards a stricter interpretation 
of the term “necessary,” the Appellate Body 
should have applied a stricter standard for 
necessity in its analysis.101 
Like the Panel in Korea—Beef, which found 
the dual retail system is a disproportionate 
measure not necessary to secure compliance 
with Korean law against deceptive practices, 
 
99. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 304 
(noting that the "standard of 'necessity' provided for 
in the general exceptions provision is an objective 
standard"); see also Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra 
note 53, ¶ 22 (finding in other instances where 
fraudulent sales occurred, Korea did not apply a dual 
retail system, which was evidence that the dual retail 
system was not necessary to secure compliance with laws 
or regulations). 
100. See John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World 
Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in 
the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1173, 1182-83 (1999) (arguing that consistently 
adjudicating litigants’ claims is the objective "if the 
WTO dispute system is to achieve and maintain 
legitimacy under international law"). 
101. See generally Steve Charnovitz, An Analysis of 
Pascal Lamy’s Proposal on Collective Preferences, 8 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 449, 469 (2005) (arguing that when the WTO 
uses the weighing and balancing technique to evaluate 
“necessity,” it needs to weigh the societal benefits of 
the measure with the potential "damage of the measure 
to the multilateral negotiating framework”). 
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the Appellate Body should have found that the 
U.S. trade-restrictive measures against 
Internet gambling were not necessary to invoke 
a public order exception.102 The Appellate Body 
in this case did not examine other less trade-
restrictive measures that the United States 
could have taken.103 Rather than implementing 
the trade-restrictive Wire Act, Travel Act, 
and the IGBA, the United States could have 
entered into negotiations with Antigua in 
order to find other reasonable laternatives to 
prevent or reduce the alleged harm associated 
with the remote supply of gambling.104 
1. The Appellate Body Erroneously Shifted the 
Burden of  
Proof Away from the United States 
 In determining necessity, the Appellate Body 
failed to adequately balance a series of 
factors. One factor is the extent to which the 
measure contributes to the realization of the 
goal pursued.105 In this case, the United 
States argued that the implementation of 
Internet gambling regulations was necessary to 
maintain public order and/or to protect public 
 
102. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 
163 (finding that alternative, WTO-consistent measures 
were reasonably available to Korea to meet its 
enforcement level; therefore Korea could not justify 
the dual retail system as necessary under Article XX). 
103. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 (arguing that a 
Member must first explore and exhaust all GATT/WTO 
compatible alternatives before resorting to WTO-
inconsistent measures). 
104. See generally Amelia Porges, Settling WTO 
Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 141, 142 (2003) (arguing that 
negotiation should be used to settle disputes between 
parties and that the failure to reach early settlements 
in disputes particularly harms developing countries). 
105. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 
163 (noting that a measure is likely considered 
necessary if it greatly contributes to the pursued 
goal). 
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morals.106 Although the Panel confirmed that 
the United States had certain concerns that 
were specific to the remote supply of gambling 
and betting services, it did not analyze the 
extent to which the Wire Act, the Travel Act, 
and the IGBA are necessary in contributing to 
the realization of the goal pursued.107 
The Panel in Korea—Beef established that 
because Korea had a measure that was 
inconsistent with the GATT, it had the burden 
of showing that there were no WTO-consistent 
measures reasonably available.108 The United 
States—Antigua Panel correctly looked to 
Korea—Beef and determined that a key element 
of the application of the “necessity” test of 
Article XIV is whether the United States 
explored and exhausted reasonably available 
WTO-consistent measures.109 The Appellate Body 
 
106. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.521 (arguing that 
because the U.S. concerns are "specific to the remote 
supply of gambling and betting services," measures 
enacted to alleviate those concerns relating to the 
"non-remote supply of gambling and betting services 
cannot be compared and examined as WTO-consistent 
alternatives"). 
107. See id. ¶ 6.522 (noting there were other WTO 
consistent alternatives because Antigua argued that "it 
has in place a regulatory regime that is sufficient to 
address the specific concerns identified by the United 
States with respect to the remote supply of gambling 
services"). Antigua’s regulations include "requirements 
for identity verification, fraud prevention and 
gambling addiction," and Antiguan law that specifically 
prohibits underage gambling by Antiguan law. Id. 
108. Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 59, ¶ 665; 
see also discussion supra Part I.B.3 (emphasizing that 
a Member must explore and exhaust all GATT/WTO 
compatible alternatives before resorting to WTO-
inconsistent measures). 
109. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.531 (determining 
that in "rejecting Antigua’s invitation to engage in 
bilateral or multilateral consultations and/or 
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erred when it reversed the Panel’s decision on 
the basis that the Panel did not focus on a 
specific alternative measure that was 
reasonably available to the United States.110 
Specifically, the Appellate Body stated that 
the Panel’s “necessity” analysis was flawed 
because “it did not focus on an alternative 
measure that was reasonably available to the 
United States.”111 In making that 
determination, the Appellate Body deviated 
from previous WTO decisions, such as Korea—
Beef, where the burden was on Korea to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Panel 
that alternative measures consistent with the 
WTO agreement were not reasonably available.112 
Based on prior jurisprudence, the Appellate 
Body in the United States—Antigua dispute 
wrongfully shifted the burden of finding 
reasonable alternative measures away from the 
United States.113 
negotiations, the United States failed to pursue in 
good faith a course of action" that may have resulted 
in determining "a reasonably available WTO-consistent 
alternative"). 
110. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 317 
(arguing that consultations with Antigua "was not an 
appropriate alternative for the Panel to consider 
because consultations are a process, the results of 
which are uncertain"). 
111. Id.  
112. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 (noting that the 
Member enacting WTO-inconsistent regulations has the 
burden of showing that it explored other means). 
113. See Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, How Can the United 
States Correct Multi-National Corporations’ 
Environmental Abuses Committed in the Name of Trade?,
15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 65 (2004) (arguing that 
the WTO’s determination of which party has the burden 
of proof shows "the WTO’s pro-trade bias" because the 
country enacting trade restrictive measures has the 
burden of justifying those measures). The number of 
disputes resolved by the WTO DSB addressing objections 
under Article XX of the GATT indicates that the 
challenging party often has the advantage. Id. 
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2. The Appellate Body Failed to Address the 
Restrictive Trade Impact of the United States’ 
Measures 
Another factor in the necessity test is the 
extent to which complying with the measures 
produces restrictive effects on international 
commerce.114 Antigua argued that the U.S. 
federal restrictions on Internet gambling, 
when read together with the relevant state 
laws, have the effect of total prohibition, 
which is the most trade-restrictive approach 
possible.115 The United States defended its 
regulations by arguing that a Member has the 
right to heavily restrict a highly risky 
service, by allowing the use of a less risky 
service, which in this case is gambling by 
non-remote means.116 Although the United States 
may have a valid interest in maintaining 
public order or protecting public morals, it 
chose to do so in the most trade-restrictive 
means possible, rather than finding 
 
114. See Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 
163 (explaining that a "measure with a slight impact on 
imported products might be more easily considered as 
necessary, compared to a measure with intense or 
broader restrictive effects"); see also Appellate Body, 
United States—Shrimp, supra note 28, ¶ 138 (stating 
that if Article XX allowed Members to adopt any measure 
conditioning access to its market, "market access could 
become subject to an increasing number of conflicting 
policy requirements for the same product", thus leading 
to "the end of the WTO multilateral trading system"). 
115. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 309 
(arguing that it would be an impossible burden if the 
WTO required a responding party to identify all less 
restrictive alternative measures and to "show that none 
of those measures achieve the desired objective"). 
116. See id. ¶ 95. 
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alternative methods of accomplishing its 
goal.117 
Although the Panel agreed that the Wire Act, 
the Travel Act, and the IGBA have a 
significantly restrictive trade impact, its 
analysis revealed that it did not place much 
weight on the restrictive trade impact of the 
three federal statutes.118 Further, the 
Appellate Body did not completely address this 
aspect of the Panel’s Report, so neither the 
Panel nor the Appellate Body gave this factor 
enough weight in the necessity test when 
analyzing the restrictive effects of the 
disputed measures on international commerce.119 
B. THE PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS FOOTNOTE 5 OF GATS ARTICLE XIV 
In their analyses, both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body did not adequately address a 
relevant component of Article XIV, namely 
footnote 5, and therefore did not examine the 
entire textual context.120 The Panel mentioned 
footnote 5 once in its analysis,121 and that 
 
117. See Sykes, supra note 57, at 415-16 (noting that 
other factors used in a least-restrictive means test 
used in previous GATT cases include "the effect of 
alternative policies on trade, the administrative 
difficulties and resource costs associated with 
alternative policies, and the regulatory efficacy of 
those polices"). 
118. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.521 (determining 
that the United States had legitimate concerns specific 
to the remote supply of gambling, which it found 
suggested that the measures in question were 
necessary). 
119. Cf. Appellate Body, Korea—Beef, supra note 53, ¶ 
158. 
120. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV.
275, 281-82 (1989) (remarking on the potential 
importance of a footnote by highlighting the well known 
“footnote 4” from Carolene Products).  
121. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 3.279 (finding 
that the specific threats posed by organized crime, 
which stems from the remote supply of gambling, meet 
the high standard of footnote 5). 
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conclusion was approved by the Appellate 
Body.122 A footnote is an important part of the 
text and has as binding a force and effect as 
the text itself.123 Footnote 5 of Article XIV 
sets a high standard in terms of when an 
exception to the GATS should be invoked, 
determining that “[t]he public order exception 
may be invoked only where a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat” to a fundamental 
interest of society.124 
Footnote 5 sets a higher standard because it 
is a two-step analysis, whereby the Appellate 
Body should first determine if the disputed 
measures satisfy Article XIV(a) and then 
continue its analysis to determine if the 
measures satisfy the requirements of the 
footnote.125 Additionally, it is significant 
that although Article XIV of the GATS and 
Article XX of the GATT are similar in language 
and purpose, GATT Article XX does not contain 
anything equivalent to footnote 5, indicating 
that the drafters intended to set a higher 
 
122. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 298-99 
(noting that the Panel referred to footnote 5 in a 
manner that understood the requirements for the public 
order exception). Because the Panel defined public 
order and analyzed the facts of the case under that 
definition, "the Panel was not required to make a 
separate, explicit evaluation that the standard of 
footnote 5 had been met." Id. 
123. Cf. Robert A. James, Are Footnotes in Opinions 
Given Full Precedential Effect?, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 267 
(1999) (arguing that the location of significant 
language, whether in the text or a footnote, is a 
matter of style which should be left up to the writer 
of an opinion). 
124. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 297. 
125. See Debra P. Steger & Peter Van Den Bossche, WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Emerging Practice and Procedure, 92 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 79, 85 (1998).  
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standard for invoking an exception under the 
GATS.126 
Because the United States presented evidence 
that the remote supply of gambling raised 
significant moral concerns, both the Panel and 
the Appellate Body were likely justified in 
determining that such concerns regarding 
organized crime, underage gambling, money 
laundering, fraud, and public health satisfied 
Article XIV(a).127 Even if the United States 
had a justifiable argument that its measures 
satisfied Article XIV(a), neither the Panel 
nor the Appellate Body’s analysis 
distinguished between the evidentiary 
requirements of Article XIV(a) and footnote 5, 
which seems to set a higher evidentiary 
burden. 
After determining that the United States 
satisfied its burden of proving that the 
measures are designed to protect public morals 
or maintain public order based on the Article 
itself, the Panel should not have stopped its 
analysis and, consequently, failed in 
determining whether the U.S. concerns 
satisfied footnote 5. Further, the Appellate 
Body’s analysis was incomplete when it simply 
determined that the Panel was not required to 
make a separate, explicit determination that 
met the standard of footnote 5.128 
The language of footnote 5 states that the 
footnote applies only to public order because 
the footnote does not mention public morals. 
 
126. Compare GATT, supra note 15, with GATS, supra note 
1.  
127. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.a (providing an 
overview of the United States’ argument that it has 
specific concerns of public order and morals with the 
remote supply of gambling). 
128. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 298 
(finding that although the Panel Report did not discuss 
footnote 5 in depth, this alone does not establish that 
the Panel failed to determine if the statutes satisfied 
the footnote’s criteria). 
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Although the Panel determined that “public 
morals” and “public order” are two distinct 
concepts, it also stated that there is 
significant overlap between these two terms, 
in effect treating the terms synonymously.129 
The Appellate Body did not evaluate the 
significance of this distinction, in light of 
the wording of footnote 5, making it difficult 
for future parties to determine the type of 
evidence or the strength of evidence required 
to satisfy the higher standard of the 
footnote. 
 The Appellate Body should have determined 
that the Panel erred by failing to apply 
Article XIV(a) in its entirety, constituting a 
failure to “make an objective assessment of 
the facts.”130 The language of footnote 5 
plainly states that invoking the public order 
exception is acceptable only when there is a 
sufficient or serious threat, so the Appellate 
Body should have required that the Panel have 
a stricter standard in defining public order 
or, at the very least, explain how the 
 
129. Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 3.279 (explaining 
that organized crime posed threats such as "social 
exploitation; corruption and subversion of the 
democratic processes; economic losses and instability; 
and diminution of the domestic security and general 
welfare of the United States and its people," which 
satisfied the public order exception in footnote 5). 
Further, both “public morals” and “public order” aim to 
protect many similar values, so there may be some 
overlap. Id. ¶ 6.468 
130. See Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO 
Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 656 (2003) 
(noting that a Panel should take the Member’s argument 
into account, but ultimately, the Panel must act in 
accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation, as 
stated in the Vienna Convention); see also Appellate 
Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products, ¶ 141, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).  
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distinctive language of the footnote played 
into the analysis beyond the mere mention of 
public morals and public order in the opinion.  
C. UNITED STATES INTERNET GAMBLING RESTRICTIONS ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE CHAPEAU OF ARTICLE XIV 
In the second step of the exceptions 
analysis, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and 
the IGBA must meet the requirements of the 
chapeau, which is the introductory clause of 
the provision.131 An analysis of the chapeau 
reveals that it requires that the measures in 
question are not applied in a manner that 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where like conditions prevail, or serve as a 
disguised restriction on trade in services.132 
Based on the reasoning used in previous 
decisions applying the chapeau of Article XX 
of the GATT, the Appellate Body in the United 
States-Antigua dispute erred when it 
determined that the U.S. Internet gambling 
restrictions satisfied the requirements 
imposed by the opening clauses of Article XIV. 
The Appellate Body failed to adhere to 
reasoning used in previous WTO decisions when 
it determined that the U.S. Internet gambling 
regulations did not constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination.133 Similar to 
 
131. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 339 
(stating that the focus of the chapeau “is on the 
application of a measure already found by the Panel to 
be inconsistent with a GATS obligation,” but a chapeau 
analysis is performed because the measure falls within 
one of the paragraphs of Article XIV). 
132. See id. (arguing that “the chapeau serves to 
ensure that Members’ rights to avail themselves of 
exceptions are exercised reasonably, so as not to 
frustrate the rights accorded other Members by the 
substantive rules of the GATS”). 
133. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.537 (noting 
that the chapeau of Article XIV is textually similar to 
the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, so the Panel 
referred to "such jurisprudence to the extent to which 
it is applicable and relevant" in interpreting and 
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United States—Gasoline, where the WTO found 
that the disputed measures failed to meet the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT because the 
United States did not engage in cooperative 
agreements, thus demonstrating unjustifiable 
discrimination, the Appellate Body should have 
concluded that the U.S. failure to negotiate 
with Antigua amounted to unjustifiable 
discrimination.134 Another example from 
Appellate Body jurisprudence that highlights 
the United States—Antigua Appellate Body’s 
mistake comes from United States—Shrimp. In
that case, the Appellate Body emphasized the 
importance of making a serious good faith 
effort to avoid a finding of unjustifiable or 
arbitrary discrimination. The United States 
demonstrated good faith through its 
willingness to try and partake in negotiating 
an agreement to avoid the trade restriction, 
even though the negotiation was not 
successful.135 Based on the previous Appellate 
Body decisions in United States—Gasoline and 
United States—Shrimp, engaging in a good faith 
attempt at negotiations appears to be a 
requirement for satisfying the chapeau.136 
applying the chapeau to Article XIV in the United 
States—Antigua dispute). 
134. See Appellate Body, United States—Gasoline, supra 
note 31, at 25 (elaborating that the kinds of analysis 
"pertinent in deciding whether the application of a 
particular measure amounts to 'arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination', may also be taken into 
account in determining the presence of a 'disguised 
restriction' on international trade"). 
135. Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 
28.  
136. See Kuei-Jung Ni, Redefinition and Elaboration of 
an Obligation to Pursue International Negotiations for 
Solving Global Environmental Problems in Light of the 
WTO Shrimp/Turtle Compliance Adjudication Between 
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In United States—Gasoline, the United States 
disregarded the additional costs for foreign 
refiners, and similarly, in the United States—
Antigua dispute, the United States may have 
minimized the economic impact that its 
regulations have on Antiguan-based gambling 
companies.137 The resulting discrimination was 
foreseeable by the United States because it 
knew that Antigua’s economy depended largely 
on its gambling industry, so the Wire Act, the 
Travel Act, and the IGBA would have a great 
economic impact.138 The United States may have 
a strong argument for imposing trade-
restrictive and economically damaging measures 
if its goal was truly to eliminate the remote 
supply of gambling as a means of protecting 
the public morality of American society, but 
laws such as the IHA undermine that goal 
because they reveal arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination.139 
Malaysia and the United States, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
111, 134-36 (2004) (citing United States—Shrimp and 
comparing the disparate actions of the Inter-American 
Convention with the efforts by the United States to 
negotiate agreements with WTO Members). According to 
the author, the element of good faith that was present 
in the Inter-American Convention should be the 
benchmark for future negotiations, which the U.S. 
international negotiations did not measure up to 
because the United States failed to take “into account 
the situations of the other negotiating countries.” Id. 
137. See Sparshott, supra note 6 (stating that Antigua 
lacked natural resources, so it "built up its Internet 
gambling industry to supplement its tourism-driven 
economy" and that licensed casinos retain over 1,300 
employees and produce approximately $68 million in 
income). 
138. See Carmel Sileo, Online Casino Pursues Long-Odds 
Lawsuit, TRIAL, May 2005, at 98 (finding that the U.S. 
ban on cross-border gambling is very damaging to 
Antigua’s economy, which is dependent on the United 
States’ business as the world’s largest consumer of 
gambling and betting services). 
139. See discussion supra Part I.C (discussing that the 
Panel and the Appellate Body determined that the IHA is 
potentially discriminating between domestic and 
foreign-service suppliers). 
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The Appellate Body should have determined 
that the U.S. Internet gambling restrictions 
represent unjustifiable discrimination.140 Both 
the Panels in United States—Gasoline and 
United States—Shrimp pointed out that the 
express terms of the chapeau in Article XX of 
the GATT address the manner of applying the 
disputed measure.141 However, the Appellate 
Body in Antigua did not follow that same 
rationale.142 Although the Appellate Body noted 
that there are situations where a statute is 
facially neutral, yet the application of the 
statute can rise to the level of 
discrimination, the Appellate Body discounted 
Antigua’s evidence that the U.S. statutes were 
applied in a discriminatory manner.143 The 
Appellate Body erred when it reversed the 
Panel’s chapeau analysis based on its 
determination that the U.S. Internet gambling 
 
140. See Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra 
note 28, ¶ 123 (noting that the exceptions of Article 
XX should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat 
the legal obligations of the holder of the right under 
the substantive rules of the General Agreement). 
141. See id. ¶ 118 (citing the Appellate Body in United 
States—Gasoline, providing that the nature and quality 
of discriminatory application of a measure is different 
from the discrimination in the treatment of products 
which were already found to be inconsistent with one of 
the substantive obligations of the GATT). 
142. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.575 (citing 
the Appellate Body in United States—Shrimp, stating 
that "a balance must be struck between the right of a 
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the 
duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights 
of the other Members"). 
143. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 352-57 
(showing that Antigua presented evidence that foreign 
suppliers of Internet gambling were prosecuted under 
the Wire Act, but there was a lack of enforcement 
against U.S. firms).  Despite Antigua’s evidence, the 
Appellate Body determined that it was inconclusive. Id. 
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restrictions, on their face, do not 
discriminate between United States and foreign 
suppliers of remote gambling services.  
Antigua pointed to four U.S. firms that 
supposedly engaged in the remote supply of 
gambling services, but despite this violation, 
none of these firms were prosecuted under any 
of the disputed federal statutes.144 Antigua 
then contrasted this lack of law enforcement 
with an Antiguan service supplier, prosecuted 
and convicted under the Wire Act, despite the 
fact that he modeled his business after a U.S. 
firm.145 Based on that strong allegation, the 
Appellate Body should have considered 
Antigua’s claim that an Internet sports book 
service based in Antigua was prosecuted and 
convicted under the Wire Act, whereas other 
similar U.S. firms had not been prosecuted.146 
If that claim were valid, it is likely that 
based on previous WTO decisions, this would 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination.147 Antigua presented evidence 
 
144. See id. ¶ 352 (stating that U.S. firms such as 
Youbet.com, TVG, Capital OTB, and Xpressbet.com engage 
in the remote supply of gambling services, but have not 
been prosecuted under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, or 
the IGBA). 
145. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.585 (citing 
United States v. Jay Cohen, finding that "an operator 
of an Internet sports book service based in Antigua was 
prosecuted and ultimately convicted under the Wire Act, 
even though that operator had modeled his business on 
that of Capital OTB, a US company that had been 
offering interstate betting" by either telephone or the 
Internet for over twenty years without prosecution). 
146. See id. ¶¶ 6.588-6.589 (noting that although the 
United States claimed that it enforced its prohibition 
on the cross-border supply of gambling equally to 
foreign and domestic suppliers, the Panel found that 
the United States did not provide evidence that it 
enforced its prohibitions in a manner consistent with 
the chapeau of Article XIV). 
147. See id. ¶ 6.585 (noting Antigua’s argument that 
the U.S. actions constitute unjustifiable 
discrimination because large-scale Internet operators 
in the United States offer betting services via the 
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of the United States’ unjustifiable 
discrimination and the United States did not 
provide concrete evidence refuting Antigua’s 
claims.148 Therefore, the Appellate Body had no 
basis for discounting Antigua’s claims.149 
The IHA further demonstrates that the United 
States enacted an Internet gambling law that 
benefited its domestic business.150 In effect, 
the IHA allows betting on horse races by phone 
or computer, but that right is limited only to 
U.S. states where it is legal to place and 
accept bets, therefore demonstrating outright 
discrimination against foreign companies.151 If 
 
Internet, but the United States does not take 
enforcement action against them). 
148. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 352 
(indicating that the United States produced evidence of 
pending prosecution proceedings against one domestic 
remote supplier of Internet gambling, but stated that 
it had no evidence as to whether enforcement action was 
being taken against the other domestic suppliers 
identified by Antigua). 
149. See id. ¶ 356 (finding that more persuasive 
evidence should have been submitted, such as "evidence 
on the overall number of suppliers, and on patterns of 
enforcement, and on the reasons for particular 
instances of non-enforcement"). 
150. See Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.597 (agreeing 
with Antigua that the text of the Interstate 
Horseracing Act appears to permit interstate wagering 
over the telephone or other modes of electronic 
communication, which would presumably include the 
Internet, as long as such wagering is legal in both 
states). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra 
note 4 (stating that the 2000 amendments to the 
Interstate Horseracing Act expanded the definition of 
interstate off-track wagering to include the Internet). 
151. See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games 
People Play: Is it Time for a New Legal Approach to 
Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 210 (2003) (noting that 
the Interstate Horseracing Act “applies to wagers 
placed in one state on the outcome of races held in 
another state”). It is up to the discretion of state 
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the United States wanted to continue to ban 
Internet gambling in the name of protecting 
public morals by restricting foreign 
operators, it would have to block all remote 
gambling, something that is unlikely given the 
popularity of interstate horseracing gambling, 
made legal under the IHA.152 Although the 
United States has the right to enact laws to 
protect its residents from the “dangers” of 
gambling, it cannot unjustifiably discriminate 
against foreigners to protect its local 
businesses.153 
The discriminatory nature of the IHA is 
clear evidence that the United States has laws 
that are more favorable to domestic 
businesses, at the expense of foreign 
companies.154 If the Panel and the Appellate 
Body agreed that the IHA is unjustifiably 
discriminatory, it is not only a clear 
 
racing or gaming officials to monitor other aspects of 
horseracing, such as licensing and policing. Id. 
152. See Kurt Eichenwald, At PartyGaming, Everything’s 
Wild, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at 31 (arguing that 
although American federal statutes state that providing 
online gambling is illegal, London-based businesses 
such as PartyPoker.com continue to operate without 
government intervention). In 2004, the company amassed 
$600 million in revenue and $350 million in profit, 
with almost ninety percent coming from American 
gamblers. Id. 
153. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Two 
Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization,
24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 15 (2003) (stating that 
there are two fundamental principles of non-
discrimination that underlie the WTO system). The 
National Treatment principle states that “no foreign 
business should be treated less favorably than a 
domestic business.” Id. 
154. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 372 
(finding that based on the implementation of the 
Interstate Horseracing Act, the United States did not 
satisfy the chapeau requirements of Article XIV because 
the United States did not demonstrate that the 
prohibitions embodied in the Interstate Horseracing Act 
are applied equally “to both foreign and domestic 
service suppliers of remote betting services for 
horseracing”). 
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indication that the U.S. measures rise to the 
level of “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” 
discrimination, but it also undermines the 
main U.S. argument that its goal is to protect 
public morals from the dangers of remote 
gambling. Bets involving horse racing are 
still gambling activities and the “moral” 
implications associated with them are not 
inherently distinct from other forms of 
gambling.  
Rather than finding that the United States 
did not meet the standards specified in the 
chapeau of Article XIV, the Appellate Body 
ruled that if the United States alters the 
IHA, so that it is not discriminatory toward 
foreign companies, the United States will be 
in compliance with its WTO treaty 
obligations.155 Both the Panels in United
States—Gasoline and United States—Shrimp 
interpreted the chapeau of Article XX as an 
expression of the principle of good faith, 
which is a general principal of international 
law and also controls the exercise of rights 
by States.156 The discriminatory nature of the 
IHA, combined with the U.S. failure to engage 
in negotiations with Antigua and its disregard 
for the impact of the statutes, demonstrate 
 
155. See I. Nelson Rose, Internet Gaming: U.S. Beats 
Antigua in WTO, CASINO CITY TIMES (May 22, 2005), 
http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/articles/19020.html 
(noting that Congress will likely amend the Interstate 
Horseracing Act to permit Americans to wager on foreign 
races and additionally, to permit foreign bettors to 
gamble on American races). Once that amendment is made, 
the United States could continue to prohibit both 
foreign and domestic Internet gambling. Id. 
156. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1-B.2 (noting that 
the Appellate Body in both cases determined that the 
United States failed to make a good faith effort in 
reaching an agreement with the disputing parties). 
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that the United States was not acting in good 
faith; thus the Appellate Body erred when it 
determined that the United States met the 
requirements under the chapeau of Article XIV. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The WTO Appellate Body should have found 
that the U.S. Internet gambling restrictions 
violated the provisions of the GATS and that 
these restrictions did not qualify for an 
exception under Article XIV. The Appellate 
Body’s decision was flawed for three main 
reasons: its interpretation did not adhere to 
the textual language of Article XIV and 
footnote 5, its analysis unduly expanded the 
definition of necessary, and it was 
inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIV. 
Inevitably, the WTO will face similar problems 
and inconsistencies in its Appellate Body 
rulings unless the WTO further addresses the 
binding nature of previous Panel and Appellate 
Body reports in its Dispute Settlement system. 
Other alternatives for resolving inconsistent 
decisions include making the language of the 
GATS more precise or having the Appellate Body 
make efforts to strictly adhere to the textual 
language. Further, because the Internet 
gambling industry is rapidly growing in size 
and revenue,157 the parties in this case should 
consider looking at other countries’ decisions 
to regulate Internet gambling and the 
potential benefits of international 
regulation.  
 
157. See Louise Kong et al., New Media, Regulations and 
Policies on Online Gambling, 
http://newmedia.cityu.edu.hk/cyberlaw/gp25/intro.html 
(last visited May 3, 2006) (noting that "gambling has 
become one of the fastest growing businesses on the 
Internet" and "it is expected that the revenue 
generated by Internet gambling will have further 
substantial growth in the years ahead"). Currently, 
there are more than 2,500 online gambling sites and the 
revenue brought in by these sites in 2006 "is nearly 
six times that of 1999." Id. 
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A. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM SHOULD FURTHER 
ADDRESS THE BINDING NATURE OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS 
Currently, the WTO has a system of de facto 
stare decisis, but it should further address 
the binding nature of previous Panel and 
Appellate Body decisions, in order to 
eliminate inconsistent Appellate Body 
decisions.158 The idea of stare decisis is 
already prevalent in Appellate Body reports, 
which indicates that the current WTO dispute 
system already acknowledges that previous 
decisions have a “binding nature” and have 
significant precedential value.159 However, the 
WTO needs to address the extent to which past 
decisions are binding. If the Appellate Body 
is explicitly bound by the reasoning used in 
past decisions, the WTO will benefit from a 
Dispute Settlement system that is fair, 
predictable, and credible.160 Besides offering 
 
158. See Jose Felgueroso, TRIPS and the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: The First Six Years, 30 AIPLA 
Q.J. 165, 223-24 (2002) (distinguishing between de jure 
and de facto stare decisis by arguing that de facto 
stare decisis depends on quasi-legal factors such as 
the tribunal's tendencies, the tribunal’s concept of 
justice, or the tribunal's need for consistency and 
uniformity). 
159. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, ¶ 
291 (noting that both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
recognized the textual similarities between Article XIV 
of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT and found 
previous interpretations of Article XX relevant in its 
analysis of Article XIV). 
160. See Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: 
Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investment 
Protection Agreements and at the World Trade 
Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 280 (1997) (noting 
that although the WTO has not formally adopted stare 
decisis, the way in which the panels interpret the 
TRIPS Agreement will more specifically determine the 
TRIPS obligations of WTO Members). But see Dale Arthur 
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stability and certainty, a system of binding 
precedent would also level the playing field 
between first and third world countries, as 
well as create legitimacy in Appellate Body 
decisions.161 
If there is no formal legal obligation for 
the Appellate Body to follow its own 
decisions, there is a risk that, as in the 
United States—Antigua dispute, the Appellate 
Body will depart from or expand upon previous 
decisions without sufficient justification.162 
Here, the Appellate Body deviated from its 
past decisions, but because its decision is 
the final step in the WTO dispute settlement 
process and it has no legal obligation to 
adhere to its past decisions, Antigua has to 
suffer for the Appellate Body’s deviation. 
Formally addressing the binding nature of 
previous decisions would legitimize the 
system, serve as a check on its decisions, and 
ensure that the Appellate Body adequately 
 
Oesterle, The WTO Reaches Out to the Environmentalists: 
Is it Too Little, Too Late?, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 1, 18 (2000) (arguing against developing WTO 
case law and precedent in protectionist trade barriers 
disputes because panels do not have the political 
authority or expertise to carry out that role). When 
there is a complicated case concerning international 
trade agreements, member governments should negotiate 
and come to a consensus, rather than have the WTO 
panels look to case law to make a decision. Id. at 19. 
161. See Theodore R. Posner & Timothy M. Reif, Homage 
to a Bull Moose: Applying Lessons of History to Meet 
the Challenges of Globalization, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
481, 503 (2000) (noting that a trade imbalance exists 
between larger and smaller trading countries because 
smaller countries rely on market access to larger 
countries). Because of this trade imbalance, larger 
trading countries are able to shape global trade rules. 
Id. 
162. See Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De 
Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a 
Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 900 (2001) 
(arguing that stare decisis serves as "a shield against 
judicial activism, or worse yet, judicial tyranny"). In 
order to avoid arbitrary discretion, courts should 
conform to strict rules. Id. 
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interprets and applies the law.163 The 
Appellate Body’s final report binds the 
parties unless there is a consensus of WTO 
Members against the report.164 The adoption of 
stare decisis would also reduce tension 
between first and third world countries 
because first world countries would not be 
able to use their political or economic power 
to influence the outcome of a dispute.165 
B. WTO MEMBERS SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING THE  
LANGUAGE OF THE GATS MORE PRECISE 
The Members of the WTO should consider 
amending the language of Article XIV of the 
GATS to explicitly define the term 
“necessary.”166 General exceptions to a 
Member’s obligations under GATS are raised 
under Article XIV, which requires that the 
exception be “necessary to protect public 
morals or maintain public order,” “necessary 
 
163. See id. at 903 (noting that stare decisis 
increases legitimacy when it increases the probability 
that similar cases will be treated in an equal manner, 
which is an important concept of justice). 
164. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The 
World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 531-32 
(2000) (noting that the consensus requirement assures 
the automatic adoption of final reports because of the 
assumption that the winning party will be “unwilling to 
join any consensus against a ruling in its favor”). 
165. See id. at 907-08 (arguing that the WTO system is 
successful if it aids in the trade development of 
poorer countries and one way this can be accomplished 
is if all WTO Members knew that developed countries 
were bound to international law by prior holdings). 
166. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 (explaining that 
the Appellate Body in Korea—Beef set a stricter 
standard of necessity, but the decision does not 
explain its reasoning for setting the stricter standard 
nor does it explain if that was the meaning intended by 
the WTO Members). 
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to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health,” or “necessary to secure compliance 
with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with provisions of [the] 
agreement.”167 All of the general exceptions 
originate from the term “necessary,” making it 
essential to more precisely define the term.168 
If looking to past decisions, prior rulings 
determining “necessary” under Article XX of 
the GATT do not adequately define the term to 
such a point of clarity where there is no 
confusion.169 Similar to the international 
standards established in the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (“TBT”), WTO Members should 
commonly determine a world standard for 
“necessary,” rather than having each Member 
establish its own discretionary definition of 
what measures are “necessary.”170 
C. A REGULATYORY REGIME FOR REMOTE GAMBLING  
WOULD BETTER ACCOUNT FOR THE UNIQUE NATURE  
OF REGULATING INTERNET ACTIVITY 
167. GATS, supra note 20, art. XIV. 
168. Cf. Reif & Eckert, supra note 50, at 679 (agreeing 
that the language of Article III of the GATT is vague, 
which allowed the Appellate Body to exercise 
significant discretion in developing interpretations of 
this provision).  
169. See id. at 708 (pointing to flaws in the Appellate 
Body’s decision in the Beef Hormone case because the 
Appellate Body never gave support for the fundamental 
conclusion on which the rest of its analysis is based). 
This raises the issue of the level of discretion used 
by the Appellate Body when it interprets key 
provisions. Id. 
170. See World Trade Organization, Technical Barriers 
to Trade: Technical Explanation, Technical Information 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.ht
m (last visited May 3, 2006) (determining that 
harmonization is an important aspect of non-
discrimination and national treatment, so the TBT 
Agreement encourages Members to participate in 
international bodies to provide standards for 
conformity assessment procedures). 
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The jurisdictional and technological 
complexity in regulating Internet activities 
warrants consideration of other viable 
solutions beyond mere prohibition.171 Because 
of the vast amount of revenue generated by 
online gambling and because the nature of the 
Internet mandates that any regulatory or 
prohibitory schema be constructed in the 
international arena, a regulatory regime for 
Internet gambling should be considered.172 
Several countries have successfully moved 
toward Internet gambling regulations, such as 
Britain, Australia, and Belgium, all of which 
passed new legislation regulating online 
gambling.173 For example, Britain’s new 
legislation establishes a new commission, as 
well as a body of investigators, to regulate 
the gambling industry, thus enabling online 
casinos to operate from Britain for the first 
time.174 
171. See generally Roger Clarke & Gillian Dempsey, The 
Technical Feasibility of Regulating Gambling on the 
Internet, at 6-7 (Conf. on Gambling, Tech. & Soc’y: 
Regulatory Challenges for the 21st Century, Working 
Paper, May 1998), available at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/gambling/dempsey-
clarke.pdf (reviewing the emergence and nuances 
associated with internet gambling).  
172. See Andrle, supra note 5, at 1391-92 (noting the 
global nature of online gambling).  
173. See Javad Heydary, Advertising for Online 
Gambling–Is it Legal?, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, 
available at 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/42696.html (last 
visited August 26, 2006) (advocating a pro-Internet 
regulation position in light of the nonenforcement of 
Internet gambling laws and remote gambling’s legality 
in several countries). 
174. See id. 
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Currently, there is confusion because every 
country has its own policy on what types of 
Internet gambling it allows and whether its 
inhabitants can have legal access to Internet 
gambling. States should be encouraged to grant 
a limited amount of gambling licenses, which 
would allow countries that are worried about 
the effects of gambling on public morals, such 
as the United States, to monitor the amount of 
gambling and impose technical safeguards on 
Internet gambling providers.175 
The rise in popularity of Internet gambling 
makes prohibition an ineffective solution, 
while a regulatory licensing scheme would be 
an economically beneficial solution.176 Forcing 
online casinos to comply with strict licensing 
requirements would help to legitimize the 
virtual casinos that are abiding by 
international rules and also, fees from these 
licensing requirements could be used to 
monitor these Internet gambling sites.177 
Additionally, operators and Internet gambling 
sites will be more reputable if they are 
 
175. See Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next 
Millennium: A Look Into the Proposed Ban on Internet 
Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 444-45 (2000) 
(arguing that the United States could benefit from 
strict licensing regulations because licensing fees 
will enable the United States to monitor and legitimize 
Internet gambling sites). 
176. See Andrle, supra note 5, at 1407 (arguing that 
prohibition plan may exacerbate the problem of Internet 
gambling in the United States because "domestic laws 
that prohibit Internet gambling may discourage 
respected U.S. casino operators from entering the 
online casino market"); see also Joseph M. Kelly, 
Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 171 
(2000) (arguing that a regulatory proposal by the North 
American Gaming Regulators Association calls for a new 
commission composed of individuals with an expertise in 
Internet gambling). 
177. See Karadbil, supra note 175 at 444; see also Kong 
et al., supra note 157 (noting that the loss of tax 
revenue in many countries has forced other governments 
to re-examine their stance towards regulating Internet 
gambling). 
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forced to comply with licensing requirements, 
which could include paying operating fees or 
subjecting to personal and credit 
investigations.178 
CONCLUSION 
The Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA 
do not meet the requirements for an exception 
under Article XIV of the GATS, and the 
Appellate Body therefore erred when it found 
that these restrictions are necessary to 
protect public morals or maintain public 
order. In finding that the United States’ 
restrictions on Internet gambling qualified 
for an exception under Article XIV of the 
GATS, the Appellate Body failed to adequately 
balance international free trade rules with 
the United States’ desire to continue to 
enforce federal restrictions relating to 
Internet gambling. In its decision, the 
Appellate Body failed to adhere to previous 
WTO decisions dealing with similar 
jurisprudence, failed to adhere to the text of 
Article XIV, and failed to uphold the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV. 
In order to resolve future problems and 
inconsistencies in its Appellate Body rulings, 
the WTO should further address the binding 
nature of previous decisions in its Dispute 
 
178. See Andrle, supra note 5, at 1406-08 (arguing that 
a strong regulatory system may adequately resolve some 
of the societal concerns revolving around online 
gambling because "specialized technology such as data-
tracking systems that monitor Internet casino 
transactions make spotting and screening out compulsive 
gamblers easier than land-based casinos"). 
Additionally, electronic records can be saved, making 
it easier to identify addictive and compulsive 
behavior. Id. 
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Settlement System. Otherwise, WTO Members 
should consider making the language in Article 
XIV of the GATS more precise. Alternatively, 
because of the growth and nature of the 
Internet gambling industry, the WTO should 
recommend that future parties develop a more 
permanent solution, such as a scheme 
regulating Internet gambling. 
